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THE DISAPPOINTING HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES ACT
DAVE OWEN*
INTRODUCTION
For years, the United States has struggled to develop a legal
'framework capable of providing for sustainable management of
ocean resources. Despite these efforts, severe environmental
problems have persisted.' In recent years, despite long-standing
attempts at fisheries management, one fish stock after another has
collapsed, putting small fishermen out of business and decimating
ecosystems and coastal economies.2 Runoff has loaded coastal
waters with nutrients and other pollutants, leading to algal blooms,
fish kills, and dead zones. 3 Now, with an energy-industry-friendly
administration in power, areas off some of the country's most
popular coastlines are being eagerly eyed, despite local popular
opposition, for oil and natural gas drilling.4
* Law clerk, Judge Samuel Conti, United States District Court, Northern District
of California; J.D., 2002, University of California at Berkeley School of Law
(Boalt Hall); B.A., 1996, Amherst College. The author would like to thank
David Caron, Harry Scheiber, and the staff of New York University
Environmental Law Journal for their assistance in preparing this article. The
author may be reached at daveowen@alumni.amherst.edu.
' See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Sustaining the Unknown Seas:
Changes in US. Ocean Policy and Regulation Since Rio '92, 32 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,190, 10,192 (2002) ("U.S. ocean policy has yet to fully
embrace the precautionary approach and the necessary long-term thinking that
sustainable use requires.").
2 See Christopher J. Carr & Harry N. Scheiber, Dealing with a Resource
Crisis: Regulatory Regimes for Managing the World's Marine Fisheries, 21
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 45-47 (2002); Michael C. Laurence, Note, A Call to
Action: Saving America's Commercial Fisherman, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 825, 825-29 (2002).
3 Craig, supra note 1, at 10,200-01.
4 See NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY:
RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR
AMERICA'S FUTURE, 5-3 to 5-10 (2001) (describing the need for greater domestic
energy production, including increased offshore drilling, and showing the
locations of America's oil and natural gas fields), availiable at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/Chapter5.pdf.
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Thirty years ago, Congress drafted a law ostensibly intended
to address such problems and to ensure sustainable use of
America's oceans. The National Marine Sanctuaries Act
(NMSA)--originally enacted as Title III of the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 5-- empowered the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to set aside and
develop management plans for particularly important areas of
America's oceans. 6 In 1972, Congress had expressed high hopes
for the Act, predicting that it would provide for comprehensive,
balanced management of the oceans, protecting them from oil
spills and rapacious extraction while also furthering the economic
use of marine resources.7
The Act, however, has fallen short of these expectations. For
years it languished at the hands of unsympathetic presidential
administrations. NOAA proved to be a reluctant and ineffectual
instigator of the designation process, and few of our current
sanctuaries came into existence without substantial help from
Congress. While those designations enjoyed widespread political
support, and the resulting program seems to arouse little political
antipathy, the sanctuaries that currently exist are widely criticized
for providing insufficient resource protection. Huge areas of ocean
remain unprotected.
This Article traces the history of the marine sanctuary
program, a task largely ignored by scholars, 8 and examines why
' Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052, 1061-63.
6 National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445 (2000).
Technically the statute empowers the Secretary of Commerce to develop these
management plans for designated areas, but the Secretary delegated the authority
to administer those provisions of the Act to the Administrator of NOAA. See
Marine Sanctuaries, Program Guidelines, 39 Fed. Reg. 10,255 (Mar. 19, 1974)
(noting March 13, 1974 delegation of authority to the NOAA Administrator to
exercise authority under Title III of the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972.)
7 See infra Part I(B).
8 Only two articles have been devoted specifically to the Marine Sanctuaries
Program, and both are over twenty years old. See Michael C. Blumm & Joel G.
Blumstein, The Marine Sanctuaries Program: A Framework for Critical Areas
Management in the Sea, 8 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,016 (1978); John
Epting, National Marine Sanctuary Program: Balancing Resource Protection
with Multiple Use, 18 Hous. L. REv. 1037 (1981). See also Jeff Brax, Zoning
the Oceans: Using the National Marine Sanctuaries Act and the Antiquities Act
to Establish Marine Protection Areas and Marine Reserves in America, 29
ECOLOGY L.Q. 71, 81-84 (2002) (describing the legislative history of the
NMSA). Other accounts summarizing the Program's history are somewhat
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the program has been a disappointment. Part I begins with the
1972 enactment of the NMSA and discusses the contrast between
Congress's ambitiously stated goals and the anemic, ill-designed
law it actually drafted. Part II analyzes the story of the program
through successive administrations. The program's beginnings
suffered benign neglect under Ford, briefly reemerged through
Carter's efforts at revitalization, and then disappeared as Reagan
and, to a lesser extent, George H.W. Bush attempted to relegate the
program to irrelevance. In the late Bush/early Clinton period, it
emerged again for a period of intense congressional and executive
activity. For most of the remainder of the Clinton presidency it
again disappeared from view, as NOAA concentrated on
improving sanctuary management rather than on expanding the
system, but it reappeared on the national stage in the eleventh hour
of Clinton's administration.
Part III of this Article discusses the lessons of this history, and
concludes that Congress delegated NOAA a difficult task without
providing it with any of the tools necessary for success, all but
ensuring that nothing could be accomplished without the active
support of either Congress or the President. Presidential support
has mostly been lacking, however, and congressional interest has
been sporadic. As a result, the program has provided uneven
protection and has fallen well short of providing the
comprehensive, balanced management scheme Congress originally
envisioned.
The NMSA thus serves as an excellent example of how not to
go about protecting the environment. By delegating power to an
understaffed agency and providing that agency with nebulous
goals, no clear mission, and no internal or external incentives to
act, Congress all but ensured ineffectual protection. The result has
been a program with few political costs but with disappointingly
little environmental protection to its credit. Part IV considers
inaccurate. Compare JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 525-29
(dividing the history of the program into two phases-the earlier phase involving
slow, agency-driven designations of small areas for specific purposes, and the
second phase involving streamlined Congressional designation of large areas for
broader purposes) with infra Part III (noting that some later designations were
slower, and, although generally somewhat larger, were in fact quite consistent in
scale and purpose with some of NOAA's earlier designations, and describing a
halt in the designation process between 1994 and 2000 due to lack of concern on
Capitol Hill, increased complexity of the process, and increased managerial
duties).
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various directions in which Congress could take the program, and
the Article closes with suggestions for how the NMSA should be
strengthened and turned into a more effective instrument of ocean
protection.
I
CREATION OF THE NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES ACT
A. Passage of the Act
In 1969, an oil well shaft off the southern California coast
ruptured, venting millions of gallons of oil into the biologically
rich waters off of Santa Barbara.9 The oil diffused over 800 square
miles of ocean and then, when the winds shifted, drifted toward
land, blackening coastal beaches.' °  The extensive damage
appalled the nation, and the spill is still recognized as a seminal
event in the development of the modern American environmental
movement." Even today, the smell of oil lingers over Santa
Barbara's beaches, and judicial decisions continue to acknowledge
the lingering shadow of the spill. 12
9 California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1165-1166 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill and its influence on state and federal
regulations); KENNETH C. CLARKE & JEFFREY J. HEMPHILL, THE SANTA
BARBARA OIL SPILL: A RETROSPECTIVE, at http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/-jeff/
sb_69oilspill/santa barbara 1969_oilspill.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2003); A.E.
KEIR NASH ET AL., OIL POLLUTION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A STUDY OF THE
SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL 1-3 (1972).
l0 California v. Norton, 311 F.3d at 1166; NASH ET AL., supra note 9, at 3.
See id. at 1166-67; CLARKE & HEMPHILL, supra note 9; Miles Corwin, The
Oil Spill Heard 'Round the Country, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1989, at 23 ("The
blowout was the spark that brought the environmental issue to the nation's
attention.") (quoting Arent Schuyler, lecturer emeritus at the University of
California, Santa Barbara).
12 See, e.g., California v. Norton, 311 F.3d at 1167. The case involved
California's challenge to the federal government's extension of mineral
exploration leases off the California coast. At the outset, the court's opinion
states, "[b]efore we embark, we briefly recollect the failures that these
environmental protections are designed to prevent by providing for substantial
state involvement in federal decisions concerning offshore oil drilling," and
proceeds to discuss the history of the 1969 oil spill. Id. at 1165-67. The court
held that the federal government could not extend the leases without allowing
California to perform a consistency review and that the federal government
needed to provide some justification for determining that the lease extensions
were categorically exempt from NEPA review. See id. at 1170-78. The practical
result of the decision was to delay, at least for a time, the federal government's
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The spill helped spur development of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other giants within the
rubric of environmental legislation.' 3  In addition, it helped
galvanize congressional will towards passing the NMSA.
14
Legislative efforts at ocean protection had preceded the spill; in
1968, the House of Representatives considered eleven bills aimed
at providing protection to discrete areas of the oceans. 15 Potent
industry opposition kept all of these bills from leaving the House
Merchant and Marine Fisheries Committee, however, and it was
only when the Council on Environmental Quality released a study
of ocean dumping,' 6 and when the spill and other spectacular
disasters further aroused public outrage, 17 that the legislative
response began to succeed.
In 1971, the House passed H.R. 9727,18 which eventually
became the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972.19 The primary purpose of the bill was to regulate ocean
dumping, 20 and much of the associated debate centered around the
anti-pollution provisions of Titles I and 11.21 Title III created the
National Marine Sanctuaries Program.22 The bill passed the House
with a resounding 305-3 majority,23 but Title III stalled in the
Senate, where numerous senators expressed concern about the
legality and advisability of Title III's effects on the United State's
ability to restart drilling off the California coast.
13 CLARKE & HEMPHILL, supra note 9, at 4; Nick Welsh, The Big Spill,
SANTA BARBARA INDEP., Jan. 26, 1989, at 24-25.
14 Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,018. Support for the NMSA also
grew out of prior legislative efforts to provide protection and out of the Stratton
Report, a report on ocean policy and management commissioned byCongress in
1966 and issued in 1969. NOAA, History of the National Marine Sanctuaries
Act, [hereinafter NOAA, NMSA History] at
http://www.sanctuaries.nos.noaa.gov/natprogram/nplegislation/NMSALegHisto
ry.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
" See Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,018.
16 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, OCEAN DUMPING: A NATIONAL POLICY
(1970).
17 See Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,018.
'8 92nd Cong. (1971).
19 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
532, 86 Stat. 1052.
20 See 117 CONG. REC. 43,052 (1971).
21 See, e.g., id. at 30,850-55.
22 Id. at 31,132, 43,056.
23 Id. at 31,159-60.
20031
N. Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
marine jurisdiction.24 The Senate also passed the bill, but without
Title III, and a conference committee then attempted to sort out the
differences.25 One year later, the committee reached its resolution,
agreeing on a final bill with the House's version of Title III
essentially reinstated and qualified only by language clarifying the
Act's consistency with accepted principles of international law.
26
Both the House and Senate passed the bill, 27 and on October 23,
1972, President Nixon signed the Act into law.
28
B. Grand Ambitions: Congress's Rhetoric
The passage of the NMSA was accompanied by a flurry of
rhetoric, all of which suggests that members of Congress had a
fairly clear and consistent vision of what they thought they were
accomplishing. This rhetoric suggests that Congress believed it
was responding to a major problem with a comprehensive solution.
Members of Congress stated that they were creating an important
program likely to ensure balanced planning for a wide range of
uses on a broad geographic scale-in effect, a program to provide
for comprehensive multi-use management of the oceans.
Almost every member of Congress involved in the debate
mentioned the geographic scale of the problem and the broad
scope of the solution. In a typical remark, Representative Mosher
stated that "Title III ... emphasizes our national concern over
indiscriminate and thoughtless utilization of the oceans. Its
purpose is to insure the highest and best use of this national
24 See id. at 43,057-60 (1971) (statements of Sens. Hollings, Jackson &
Stevens). Senator Hollings expressed concern that the Act would extend U.S.
jurisdiction into international waters. Hollings did not disagree with the need for
the Act, but was concerned about such "creeping jurisdiction." Id. at 43,057-58.
Senator Jackson expressed concern about the jurisdictional viability of the Act.
Id. at 43,058. Senator Stevens rejected the unilateral extension of sanctuaries
beyond the territorial sea. Id. at 43,060.
The Senate also was concerned that jurisdiction over marine areas more properly
rested with the Department of the Interior (DOI). See Blumm & Blurnstein,
supra note 8, at 50,019. In the House, Rep. Aspinall had expressed similar
concerns. See 117 CONG. REc. 30,863-65 (1971). These jurisdictional disputes
between DOI and NOAA would continue to affect the history of the program.
See, e.g., infra notes 120-121.
25 See Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,019.
26 118 CONG. REc. 36,041-42 (1972) (statement of Rep. Lennon).
27 Id. at 36,045.
28 Pub. L. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972).
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asset.",29  Representative Lennon similarly emphasized the
importance of comprehensive management.30  Representative
Dingell asserted that the bill would afford "considerable
environmental protection, 3'1 and Representative Keith asserted
that "[i]ts purpose is to assure the preservation of our coastal areas
and fisheries." 32 Even the bill's few opponents assumed its scale
would be grand. Representative Aspinall, the most vocal skeptic,
argued that it "could result in locking up unnecessarily offshore
resources valued at billions of dollars."
33
There were some hints that the program might not be so
comprehensive and that its scale might not be quite so grand.
Dingell, for example, noted that, "[T]itle III is permissive-it
allows the Secretary of Commerce to declare sanctuaries in
appropriate cases. We make no attempt to force him to do so."
34
Similarly, Representative Pelly pointed out that "[h]ow many such
marine sanctuaries should be established remains to be
determined, 3 5 and Representative Harrington, despite declaring
that "[t]hese sanctuaries will immediately preserve vital areas of
our coastline from further damage," stated "[m]y only reservation
is that we may be drastically underfunding both titles II and III.
",36
These statements, however, were isolated islands of concern amid
a sea of self-congratulation; the overall tone of the debate clearly
suggests Congress's belief that it had enacted landmark,
comprehensive legislation.
Although the legislation may have been comprehensive,
Congress was careful to emphasize that it was intended to be
balanced and not prohibitory. Almost all of the bill's proponents
emphasized the importance of allowing for both preservation and
exploitation.37 Representative Keith, for example, noted that by
29 117 CONG. REc. 30,855 (1971).
30 See id., at 30,856-57 (statement of Rep. Lennon) (describing the threats to
ocean waters from agriculture and dumping, and emphasizing consideration of
all pertinent factors including human health and fisheries resources, and the
marine environment, before issuance of permits).
31 Id. at 30,853.
32 Id. at 30,858.
33 Id. at 30,865.
" Id. at 30,853.31 Id. at 31,136.
36 Id. at 31,155.
37 See, e.g., id. at 30,855 (statement of Rep. Mosher) ("Title III of H.R.
9727 ... emphasizes our national concern over indiscriminate and thoughtless
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preserving the oceans, the bill was "protecting our source of
protein and at the same time assuring such industrial and
commercial development as may be necessary in the national
interest." 38 Keith further declared that "the word 'sanctuaries[]'
carries a misleading connotation. It implies a restriction and a
permanency not provided in the title itself."39  Similarly,
Representative Pelly emphasized that designation under the Act
provided for multiple uses, and was not analogous to the
designation of a wilderness area.4°
All of this rhetoric points to a relatively consistent
congressional intent. Congress believed that it was creating a
system for comprehensive assessment and development of a
management scheme for ocean resources-a system analogous not
to the National Parks or the wilderness system but instead to the
geographically broad, multiple-use-oriented system of the national
forests. Designation was to be the beginning of a process of
developing a broad-based management scheme rather than the
culmination of attempts to create prohibitions. The Act was to be
an attempt to bring planning and balance to the United States'
ocean management as a whole, rather than to focus particular
protections on relatively small areas while leaving the great
majority of areas unaddressed.
C. Contents of the Act
Although Congress may have expressed high hopes for the
new law, the actual statutory terms do not comport with such a
grandiose vision. The law contains more obstacles than spurs to
action, and seems designed to ensure a slow and careful
designation process rather than broadly sweeping changes. The
NMSA sets forth detailed provisions for the designation of
sanctuaries, for the development and updating of management
plans for those areas, and for enforcement of those management
plans. The Act attempts to ensure that designated areas meet
detailed criteria, are designated only after substantial input from
the public, and are not designated against the wishes of Congress
utilization of the oceans. Its purpose is to ensure the highest and best use of this
national asset."), 30,857 (statement of Rep. Lennon), 30,858 (statement of Rep.
Keith), 31,136 (statement of Rep. Pelly).
38 Id. at 30,858.
39 id.
40 Id. at 31,136.
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or the states in which portions of the sanctuaries will lie. In
combination, these provisions ensured that sanctuary designation
would be a complicated and difficult process.
Section 301 sets forth the purposes of the Act, which, in their
broad scope, appear to track some of the congressional rhetoric. It
declares the importance of protecting "special areas" of the
ocean, 41 and states that "certain areas of the marine environment
possess conservation, recreational, ecological, historical, scientific,
educational, cultural, archeological, or esthetic qualities which
give them special national, and in some cases international,
significance. 4 2 After asserting that it will allow for designation
and protection of such areas, the Act then states that one of its
purposes is to "provide authority for comprehensive and
coordinated conservation and management of these marine
areas." 43 It then specifies some of the uses to be balanced,
emphasizing both the facilitation, "to the extent compatible with
the primary objective of resource protection [of] all public and
private uses of the resources of these marine areas not prohibited
pursuant to other authorities, '44 and its intent "to protect[,]...
restore and enhance natural habitats, populations, and ecological
processes. ' 45  Thus the management mission, while perhaps
limited to special areas, is ambitiously all-encompassing.
Sections 303 and 304 form the heart of the Act, specifying
criteria and procedures for designating sanctuaries. Section 303(a)
states that "[tihe Secretary may designate" any area meeting a
certain set of criteria.46 The criteria include the resource values of
the area, the adequacy of existing regulatory regimes to protect
those resources, and the amenability of the area to "coordinated
and comprehensive conservation and management." 47  Section
303(b)(1) sets forth a list of "factors" the Secretary must consider
in reaching a designation, again requiring consideration of a range
of resource values but also requiring consideration of the
socioeconomic effects of designation.48 Section 303(b)(2) requires
41 See 16 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(3) (2000).
42 Id. § 1431(a)(2).
43 Id. § 1431(b)(2).
44 Id. § 1431(b)(6).
41 Id. § 1431(b)(3).
46 Id. § 1433(a).
47 Id.
48 See id. §§ 1433(b)(1)(A) (requiring consideration of "the area's natural
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the Secretary to consult with the relevant House and Senate
Committees, the Secretaries of State, Interior, Transportation, and
Defense, any other interested federal agency, with state and local
agency heads, "the appropriate officials of any Regional Fishery
Management Council," and "other interested persons. 49
Section 304 sets forth the procedure for designating a
sanctuary, and also includes extensive requirements for the
participation of Congress, other agencies, and the public. The
Secretary must publish a notice to initiate the process,5° prepare a
draft environmental impact statement (DEIS),5 l and hold public
hearings, including "at least one public hearing in the coastal area
or areas that will be most affected by the proposed designation.
'" 5 2
The Secretary must submit the DEIS and other documentation to
other federal agencies and to House and Senate committees.5 3 The
committees have forty-five days to hold hearings on the
designation, and may prepare a report that the Secretary must then
consider.5 4  If, after all of these consultations, designation
continues, the Secretary must publish a final notice and final
regulations for management of the sanctuary.
55
Together, Sections 303 and 304 provide for a procedurally
complex designation process, ensure substantial input from a
variety of sources prior to any designation, and give both the
public and numerous powerful government entities many
opportunities to weigh in on the designation process. But despite
setting NOAA up for a potentially difficult task, the Act provides
few spurs to action. Its key provision states that NOAA "may
designate" sanctuaries, and does nothing to guarantee that NOAA
will designate. 56 The Act sets no specific goals for designation; its
resource and ecological qualities"), (b)(1)(B) (historic values), (b)(1)(H) ("the
negative impacts produced by management restrictions on income-generating
activities such as living and nonliving resource development"), (b)(1)(I) ("the
socioeconomic effect of the sanctuary designation").
41 Id. § 1433(b)(2).
5o Id. § 1434(a)(1).
52 Id. § 1434(a)(2).12 Id. § 1434(a)(3).
13 Id. § 1434(a)(1)(C).
14 Id. § 1434(a)(6).
" Id. § 1434(b)(1). Under 1984 amendments to the Act, the designation will
not take effect until Congress has had an additional forty-five days to consider it.
Pub. L. 98-498 § 304, 98 Stat. 2296, 2300.
" See 16 U.S.C. § 1433(a).
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ambitious statements of policy are not bolstered by any kind of
numerical targets. Finally, the Act provides no mechanisms, such
as citizen suits to enforce deadlines, through which private parties
or other government entities may force the designation process.
Thus, the Act created something of a paradox. On one hand,
it was clearly intended to be comprehensive. On the other hand, it
left actual decisions about the scope of the sanctuary program to
NOAA, and provided NOAA with many obstacles blocking
designation and few incentives to act. This paradox, not
surprisingly, led to disappointingly minimal protection.
II
HISTORY OF DESIGNATIONS
During the 1972 debates, Representative Harrington stated
that "[t]hese sanctuaries will immediately preserve vital areas of
our coastline from further damage. ' 57 He was mistaken. For years
after passage of the NMSA, the Act had little to do with any ocean
protection that was granted, as substantial designations were still
almost a decade away. This Part traces the inconsistent history of
the Act, following the fits and starts of the designation process
through hostile and friendly administrations and uninvolved and
activist Congresses.
51 117 CONG. REC. 31,155 (1971).
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Table 1: The Marine Sanctuaries5 8
58 See CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENv'T, NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN.,
PROTECTING OUR NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES 6 tbl. 1 (2000), available at
http://www.napawash.org/pceconomyenvironment/marinesanctuaries.pdf. See
also Key Largo Coral Reef Marine Sanctuary, Interim Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg.
2378, 2378-79 (Jan. 16, 1976); The Looe Key National Marine Sanctuary, Final
Order, 46 Fed. Reg., 946, 946-49 (Jan. 26, 1981); FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT.,
FLORIDA KEYS NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY (Sept. 20, 2001), at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/coastal/programs/fknms.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2003); Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,023. Information about who
designated each of the sanctuaries is described in detail in the following sections
of this Article.
59 Technically, the Banks were designated by legislation. The legislation was
necessary, however, only because NOAA scheduled an opening ceremony prior
to the end of the statutory congressional approval period, and needed
congressional action to save it the embarrassment of a premature ceremony. See
137 CONG. REC. H1 1,028 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991) (statement of Rep. Ortiz).
Sanctuary Date Designator Area
Designated (square miles)
Monitor 1975 Ford 1
Key Largo 1975 Ford 100
Channel 1980 Carter 1,658
Islands
Gulf of the 1981 Carter 1,255
Farallones
Gray's Reef 1981 Carter 23
Looe Key 1981 Carter 5.32 square
nautical miles
Fagatale Bay 1986 Reagan 0.25 (163 acres)
Cordell Bank 1989 Bush 526
Florida Keys 1990 Congress 3,674
Flower Garden 1992 Bush/Congress 56
Banks
59
Monterey Bay 1992 Congress 5,328
Stellwagen 1992 Congress 842
Bank
Hawaiian 1992 Congress 1,300
Islands I I _II
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Olympic Coast 1994 Congress 3,310
Thunder Bay 60  2000 Clinton (with 448
substantial
involvement
from the state of
Michigan)
Northwestern Process Clinton Approx. 95,000
Hawaiian begun in square nautical




A. Phase . The Nixon and Ford Years
The program began slowly. Under Nixon, NOAA created no
sanctuaries. It was not until 1974 that NOAA developed program
guidelines,62 and not until 1975 that the first designations took
place. Throughout this early period, the program was drastically
underfunded; until 1979, NOAA's budget contained no
independent funding for the Sanctuaries program, and management
funds came out of its general budget.63 NOAA did set aside the
site of the sunken Civil War ironclad USS Monitor, off the coast of
North Carolina, and Key Largo in Florida as the first marine
64sanctuaries. 6 Partly as a result of its lack of funding, and partly
60 See Thunder Bay Nat'l Marine Sanctuary and Underwater Preserve, About
the Sanctuary/Preserve [hereinafter About Thunder Bay Sanctuary], at
http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/glsr/thunderbay/info/about.html (last revised Jan. 31,
2003).
61 See Exec. Order No. 13,178, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,903 (Dec. 7, 2000); NOAA,
NORTHWESTERN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: CORAL REEF ECOSYSTEM RESERVE
EXECUTIVE ORDERS, available at http://hawaiireef.noaa.gov/PDFs/
nwhioverview.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
62 Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,021.
63 MARINE SANCTUARIES REVIEW TEAM, NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES:
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY app. D (1991), reprinted in The Current Status
and Future Needs of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
National Marine Sanctuary Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oceanography, Great Lakes and the Outer Continental Shelf, and Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env't, House Comm. on Merch.
Marine and Fisheries, 102d Cong. 87, 140 (1992) [hereinafter MARINE
SANCTUARIES REVIEW TEAM REPORT].
64 Monitor Marine Sanctuary, Final Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 21,706 (May
19, 1975); see Key Largo Coral Reef Marine Sanctuary, Interim Regulations, 41
Fed. Reg. 2378, 2378-79 (Jan. 16, 1976).
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because of resistance from the oil industry, NOAA did little else.65
When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, several other sites were
under consideration, but the program had been "nearly
forgotten.,
66
Neither of these designations bore much resemblance to the
grand visions of Congress. 67 The entire Monitor sanctuary is one
square mile in area, 68 and exists almost solely to protect the
shipwreck's archaeological resources. 69 The Key Largo sanctuary,
while providing protections against the removal of or damage to
natural features, 70 was only approximately 100 square miles in
area, 71 and would be dwarfed by later designations.
Each designation protected important resources. 72 Neither,
however, resembled the type of broad-based planning described in
early congressional rhetoric, and in both sanctuaries the balancing
of competing uses, if it took place at all, was minimal. On Key
Largo, regulatory provisions maintaining some recreational uses
contrasted with other provisions allowing portions of the reef to be
closed to all human access,73 suggesting at least some variation in
uses within the sanctuary. Nevertheless, neither sanctuary was
large enough to encompass a wide variety of uses. The
designations were therefore more akin to protection of small
National Monuments-analogous, perhaps, to the protection of a
sequoia grove and the Ford Theater-than to large-scale
reservations of land.
65 See Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,021; CTR. FOR THE ECON.
AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 11. In addition to lacking separate funding, the
program had no field staff for its first ten years. Id.
Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,016.
67 See supra Part I(B).
68 NOAA, MONITOR NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY, available at
http://www.sanctuaries.nos.noaa.gov/oms/omsmonitor/monitor.pdf (last visited
Feb. 23, 2003).
69 See NOAA, MONITOR NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY, at
http://monitor.nos.noaa.gov/ (last visited February 23, 2003); CTR. FOR THE
ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 7 ("The Monitor Sanctuary off Cape
Hatteras, North Carolina is unique in having no natural resources of particular
interest.").
70 See CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 14.
71 Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,023.
72 At least, each sanctuary was intended to protect resources. Designating
the Monitor sanctuary, however, has not prevented the destruction and decay of
the Monitor shipwreck. CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 7,
27.
73 See Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,023.
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B. Phase II. President Carter and the Emergence of the
Sanctuaries Program
In 1977, soon after taking office, President Carter provided
the previously moribund program with a strong rhetorical
endorsement. In a speech to Congress about his environmental
program, Carter stated:
[e]xisting legislation allows the Secretary of Commerce to
protect certain estuarine and ocean resources from the ill-effects
of development by designating marine sanctuaries. Yet only
two sanctuaries have been established since 1972, when the
program began.
I am, therefore, instructing the Secretary of Commerce to
identify possible sanctuaries in areas where development
appears imminent, and to begin collecting the data necessary to
designate them as such under the law.
74
At least two contemporary commentators viewed the speech
as a major turning point, gushing that, "May 23, 1977, may well be
the most significant date in the history of efforts to implement the
marine sanctuaries program," and that "the President's
Environmental Message... bestowed upon the program a new
level of visibility and has fostered an unparalleled level of program
activity."
75
Following the announcement, the program entered one of its
most active phases. NOAA drafted criteria for selection of
potential sites and solicited the assistance of other agencies in
designating such sites.76 The response was overwhelming. The
states nominated twenty-four sites and members of the public
nominated another thirty-five; NOAA soon had 169
recommendations.77 Three of the most significant nominations
came from the state of California, which suggested substantial
areas off Point Reyes and the Farallon Islands as well as the
Channel Islands and Monterey Bay for sanctuary status. 78 At the
14 Jimmy Carter, The Environment-The President's Message to the
Congress (May 23, 1977), reprinted in 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,057,
50,063 (July, 1977).
'5 Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,025.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 See NOAA, National Marine Sanctuaries History Timeline, at
http://www.sanctuaries.nos.noaa.gov/natprogram/nphistory/nphistory.html
[hereinafter National Marine Sanctuaries Timeline] (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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same time nominations were flowing in, NOAA twice reorganized
to facilitate development of the program. In 1978, NOAA
established an Office of Ocean Management.7 9 In 1979 that office
merged with the Office of Coastal Zone Management to form the
Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, and within
that office the Marine Sanctuaries Program came into existence. 80
This new momentum did not result, however, in a rapid
increase in designations. In 1977, NOAA expected to complete at
least two sanctuary designations by October 1978.81 Moving the
designations through the complicated administrative process took
much longer, however, and it was not until September of 1980 that
NOAA designated the Channel Islands National Marine
Sanctuary. 82 NOAA did not designate the Point Reyes-Farallon
Islands National Marine Sanctuary, 83 the Looe Key National
Marine Sanctuary, 84 or Gray's Reef National Marine Sanctuary
85
until January 26, 1981, in the waning minutes of the Carter
administration.
The new designations nevertheless represented dramatic
developments. Looe Key and Gray's Reef were similar in scale to
the Monitor and Key Largo Sanctuaries-both encompassed small
areas with rich wildlife resources, and provided relatively specific
protection against physical destruction of reef resources. 86 The
two sanctuaries off the California coast, however, were huge. The
Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary, at 1,258 square
nautical miles,87 dwarfed its predecessors, and the Point Reyes-
79 Id.
80 See id.
81 Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,026.
82 The Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary, 45 Fed. Reg. 65,198,
65,198 (Oct. 2, 1980).
83 The Point Reyes-Farallon Islands National Marine Sanctuary, Final Rule,
46 Fed. Reg. 7936 (Jan. 26, 1981). For a description illustrating the complexity
of the designation process for the Pt. Reyes-Farallon Islands and Channel Islands
sanctuaries, see Epting, supra note 8, at 1048-49 n.30.
84 The Looe Key National Marine Sanctuary, Final Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 7946
(Jan. 26, 1981).
85 The Gray's Reef National Marine Sanctuary, Final Rule, 46 Fed. Reg.
7942 (Jan. 26, 1981).
86 The Looe Key National Marine Sanctuary, Final Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 7948;
The Gray's Reef National Marine Sanctuary, Final Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. at 7944.
87 The Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary, Final Rule, 45 Fed. Reg.
at 65,203.
[Volume I11
NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES ACT
Farallon sanctuary, at 948 square nautical miles, 88 wasn't much
smaller. In addition, unlike previous designations, which were
oriented at protecting relatively small, discrete resources from the
greatest threats, the California coast sanctuaries functioned as
effective withdrawals of large areas from oil and gas exploration.
While fishing was explicitly left unregulated, other activities were
deemed permissible, and oil and gas explorations were flatly
prohibited within the new sanctuaries.8 9
Thus, at the close of the Carter administration, NOAA had
created two very different types of sanctuaries-small but strictly
protected trinkets, and large but, with the exception of limitations
on oil and gas development, unevenly protected expanses of ocean
off the California coast.
C. Phase III." Reagan
At the close of the Carter administration, the Marine
Sanctuaries Program appeared to be reborn. Six sanctuaries, four
of quite recent vintage, existed. Several others were under
consideration, and the wealth of nominations indicated public and
state enthusiasm for the program. Over the next eight years,
however, only one sanctuary-the smallest of the entire system-
would be designated.
88 The Point Reyes-Farallon Islands National Marine Sanctuary, Final Rule,
46 Fed. Reg. at 7938.
89 See id. at 7937. In a passage with prohibitions nearly identical to those for
the Channel Islands, and similar to those for future sanctuary designations were
motivated by concerns about oil and gas explorations, the designation declared:
the primary purpose of managing the area and of these implementing
regulations is to protect and to preserve the marine birds and mammals,
their habitats, and other natural resources from those activities which
pose significant threats. Such activities include: hydrocarbon
exploration and exploitation except for the laying of pipeline outside 2
nmi from the Islands, Bolinas Lagoon or Areas of Special Biological
Significance; discharges except for fish cleaning wastes and chumming
materials, certain discharges incidental to vessel use of the area such as
effluents from marine sanitation devices, engine exhaust and cooling
waters, biodegradable galley wastes, and deck wash down, and
municipal waste outfalls and dredge disposal with a certified permit;
construction on or alteration of the seabed except for navigational aids,
for certified pipelines or outfalls, and for certain other minor activities;
the unnecessary operation of certain commercial vessels within 2 nmi
of sensitive habitats and the operation of certain aircraft at lower than
1000 feet within 1 nmi of these areas; and removing or harming
historical or cultural resources.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Reagan years may have been the program's nadir. Beset
with the active opposition from the administration, the existing
programs suffered. 90 Staff positions went unfilled, and critics
charged that management programs at existing sanctuaries
languished.91 Funding levels stabilized at the beginning of the
Reagan era but then actually declined during his second term.
92
The levels of funding requested by the administration were even
lower; Congress repeatedly allocated more money than the
administration estimated was necessary.93 Most discouragingly for
program advocates, NOAA designated no new sites other than
Fagatele Bay,94 allowed the designation process for others to
stagnate, and even removed Monterey Bay from the list of
proposed sites.95  NOAA claimed that it was "designating new
sanctuaries at a pace which [would] allow [it] to integrate new
90 MARINE SANCTUARIES REVIEW TEAM, supra note 63, at 10 (asserting that
"[t]he Reagan [a]dministration was strongly opposed to the program, but
Congressional support, coupled with tacit NOAA assistance, kept it alive").
91 Marine Sanctuaries Program Reauthorization: Hearing on H.R. 4208
Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Env 't of the House Comm. on Merch. Marine and
Fisheries, 100th Cong. 104-105 (1988) [hereinafter NMSA 1988 Hearings]
(written statement of Michael Weber, Vice President for Programs, Center for
Environmental Education).
9' MARINE SANCTUARIES REVIEW TEAM, supra note 63, app. D; NMSA 1988
Hearings, supra note 91, at 21-22 (statement of Michael Weber).
The administration has certainly not provided a realistic assessment of
funding needs. Even as the administration has requested less money, it
has promised more sanctuaries. In fact, we have ended up with less
money and no sanctuaries.... Funding for the program has always
been low, but in recent years it has been abysmally low.
Id.
93 NMSA 1988 Hearings, supra note 91, at 104 (written statement of Michael
Weber).
94 See supra tbl. 1; Fagatele Bay National Marine Sanctuary Regulations,
Final Rule and Notice of Designation, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,878, 15,879-80 (April 29,
1986). The designation document stated:
[t]he Sanctuary consists of 163 acres.., of bay area of the southwest
coast of Tutuila Island, American Samoa.... The Sanctuary contains a
unique and vast array of tropical marine organisms, including corals
and a diverse tropical reef ecosystem with endangered and threatened
species, such as the hawksbill and green sea turtles, and marine
mammals like the Pacific bottlenose dolphin. The area provides
exceptional scientific value as an ecological, recreational, and aesthetic
resource and unique educational and recreational experiences.
Id. at 15,880.
" See Harold Maass, Undersea Wonder. The Teeming Waters off Monterey
at Last May Become a Sanctuary, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1990, at A3.
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sites into a well-managed National Marine Sanctuary System,"
96
but its decreasing funding requests made such claims sound
disingenuous.97 Even at sites where the designation process did
continue, extractive industries exerted a heavy influence on the
process. For example, at Cordell Bank in northern California,
98
NOAA rejected the environmentally preferred option, instead
selecting a management option that would have offered protection
only to a tiny area dwarfed by surrounding oil and gas leases.99 As
a result, by the close of Reagan's second term the program was
once again suffering and an increasingly exasperated Congress was
beginning to consider taking action to jumpstart the designation
process.
100
D. Phase IV: Bush and the Congressional Intervention
The period from 1988 until 1994, beginning with the last year
96 NMSA 1988 Hearings, supra note 91, at 11 (statement of John Carey,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, NOAA).
97 As one Member of Congress stated:
NOAA has indicated that it will be designating two new sites this year
and another in 1989. However, the proposed budget for the Program is
significantly smaller than last year, leading us to wonder if these new
Sanctuaries will be designated or, if they are, if existing Sanctuaries
will suffer.
Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Robert Davis).
98 The Cordell Bank sanctuary is centered around a seamound located off the
California coast directly north of the Pt. Reyes-Farallon National Marine
Sanctuary. According to NOAA:
[t]he Bank consists of a series of steep-sided ridges and narrow
pinnacles rising from the edge of the continental shelf. It lies on a
plateau 300-400 feet (91-122 meters) deep and ascends to within about
115 feet (35 meters) of the surface. The seasonal upwelling of nutrient-
rich bottom waters to the upper levels of the Bank stimulates the
growth of planktonic organisms. These nutrients, combined with high
light penetration in Bank waters and wide depth ranges in the vicinity,
have led to a unique association of subtidal and oceanic species. The
vigorous biological community flourishing at Cordell Bank includes an
exceptional assortment of algae, invertebrates, fishes, marine mammals
and seabirds.
Cordell Bank National Marine Sanctuary, Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,417,
22,420 (May 24, 1989).
99 See NMSA 1988 Hearings, supra note 91, at 24 (statement of Mark J.
Palmer, Executive Director, The Whale Center) (blasting NOAA's
recommendation of a small and minimally protected alternative); id. at 155
(written statement of Mark J. Palmer entitled National Marine Sanctuaries: A
Local Perspective) (illustrating the proposed sanctuary and surrounding proposed
oil and gas leases and arguing that the areas to be leased dwarf the sanctuary).
'o' See infra Part III(D).
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of the Reagan administration and ending in the early portion of the
Clinton administration, was the most active in the program's
history. Frustrated with the Reagan administration's unwillingness
to support the program, Congress began, in 1988, to take matters
into its own hands. The Bush administration initially was no more
cooperative than its predecessor, but by 1991 a combination of
congressional and electoral pressures and the political momentum
created by the Exxon Valdez disaster' 01 created a political climate
in which designations could proceed rapidly.
1. 1988 Reauthorizations-Congressional Directives
By the end of the Reagan administration, the program was at a
standstill.'0 2 NOAA seemed to be an unwilling and ineffective
manager, and Congress doubted its ability and will to develop the
program.
The 1988 reauthorization hearings and testimony reflected
this frustration. During the hearings, the House Marine Merchant
and Fisheries Committee heard criticism from numerous outside
experts who criticized the lack of funding and blasted existing
efforts. 10 3 When asked what steps ought to be taken to correct the
problems, the experts suggested that Congress should at least set
deadlines to restrict the discretion currently enjoyed by the
administration. 0 4 One expert, Jack Archer from the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute, went further, arguing that "we designate
refuges. We designate parks by legislation. It's not unheard of.
And in fact, it's the normal rule. So I think you could put together
a process that allows this as a way of dealing with an
[a]dministration that is just simply dragging its heels."'
10 5
Members of Congress condemned the Reagan administration's
efforts with equal vigor. Representative Gerry Studds, in one of
'01 Richard Charter, an environmental activist involved with each of the
California sanctuary designations, believes that the selection of the largest
alternative for the Monterey Bay sanctuary was in large part a response to the
political pressure created by the Exxon Valdez spill. Telephone Interview with
Richard Charter, Marine Conservation Advocate, Environmental Defense (May
20, 2002).
102 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
103 NMSA 1988 Hearings, supra note 91, at 21-28 (1988) (statements of
Michael Weber; Mark J. Palmer; and Jack Archer, Senior Research Fellow,
Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute).
104 Id. at 32 (Weber responding to a question from Rep. Lowry).
1"5 Id. at 33.
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the most direct statements, stated:
overall credit for the legislation is owed to the chairman of the
Oceanography Subcommittee for his dedicated efforts to pursue
a broad based reauthorization that will bring the sanctuaries
program back on course and help reverse years of inaction and
neglect by the administration. The designations of new
sanctuaries that we propose here today should never have been
necessary: The extraordinary character of Monterey Bay,
Cordell Bank and the other areas in the bill more than justify
their inclusion into the system, and my friend from Washington
deserves high praise for recognizing the need to override the
intransigence of the NOAA officials who have for too long
sought to tear down and destroy the program they were charged
with nurturing. 106
Responding to these problems, Congress attempted to create a
strengthened reauthorization of the Act. It established statutory
deadlines for the consideration of sites' 0 7 and allocated increased
funding.10 8 In addition, it provided specific directives to NOAA,
ordering it to designate Monterey Bay, Cordell Banks,
Washington's Olympic Coast, and Flower Garden Banks as
sanctuaries within specific timetables.10 9 The bill did not attempt
to circumvent the normal designation process; each designation
was still to involve all the standard public participation and agency
review procedures. 110  Nevertheless, by supplying specific
deadlines, Congress hoped to generate more substantial results.
Such results were not forthcoming. The process of
designation remained beset by opposition, primarily from the
Department of the Interior, and until 1991, the Bush administration
showed little inclination to cooperate with congressional
directives. NOAA did complete designation of Cordell Bank
106 134 CONG REC. H5815 (daily ed. Jul. 26, 1988).
107 Id. at H5819-20 (statement of Rep. Lowry); Pub. L. No. 100-627, § 202,
102 Stat. 3213, 3214 (1988) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1434(b)(1)
(2000)) (requiring the Secretary to issue either a notice of designation or an
explanation of the non-designation of a site within thirty months of the site
becoming an active candidate).
108 MARINE SANCTUARIES REVIEW TEAM REPORT, supra note 63, app. D.
109 134 CONG REc. H5820 (daily ed. July 26, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Lowry); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1434(b)(1).
110 See 134 CONG. REC. H5819-20 (daily ed. July 26, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Lowry) (stating that the reauthorization will provide deadlines for NOAA to act,
but that Congress will not act for NOAA).
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National Marine Sanctuary in 1989.111 It did not, however,
complete designation of Flower Garden Banks or Monterey Bay
until 1992,12 and the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary
was not designated until 1994."' By 1990, Congress had
designated the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary on its own,
ordering the designation of what at that time was the largest
marine sanctuary in the system' 14 without completing the
administrative process. At this time, Congress was also expressing
frustration at the slow pace of designation of Stellwagen Bank, a
gravel sand bar off the Massachusetts coast,1 15 in addition to its
lasting frustration with the Monterey Bay and Olympic Coast
designations. 116
The delays largely resulted from battles over extractive uses.
In 1990, Representative Leon Panetta, the Monterey Bay
Sanctuary's chief advocate, charged that the Bush administration
was considering allowing drilling in the Monterey Bay
Sanctuary,1 17 and in congressional hearings NOAA conceded that
the Bush administration's energy policy was a primary impediment
to sanctuary designation.118  In 1991, the Bush administration
Cordell Bank National Marine Sanctuary, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,417, 22,420
(May 24, 1989).
112 137 CONG. REC. Hl1,028 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Ortiz).
113 Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, Final Rule, 59
Fed. Reg. 24,586, 24,603 (May 11, 1994); Eric Pryne, At Last, Marine Sanctuary
off Olympic Coast to Be Official. Designation Adds Layer of Protection to
Vulnerable Area, SEATTLE TIMES, July 8, 1994, at Al.
... S. REP. No. 102-411, at 2-3 (1992).115 138 CONG. REC. H7230 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Studds) ("For almost a decade, Stellwagen Bank languished on the back burners
of NOAA's National Marine Sanctuary Program.").
116 See, e.g., 138 CONG REC. E1784 (daily ed. June 11, 1992) (statement of
Rep. Panetta); David Schaefer, U.S. Pushes to Explore for Oil off State Coast,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at Al.
117 William J. Eaton & Rudy Abramson, Bush Urged to Ban Monterey Bay
Drilling, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1990, at A3 ("The Bush [a]dministration is
debating whether to allow oil and gas drilling in the newly established Monterey
Bay national marine sanctuary, Rep. Leon Panetta (D-Carmel Valley) charged
Monday. 'I think it's nuts,' Panetta said.").
118 Oversight of the National Marine Sanctuary Program and the Sanctuary
Designation Process. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env 't,
and Subcomm. on Oceanography and Great Lakes for the House Comm. on
Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong. 17 (1990) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearing] (statement of Mr. Keeney, Director, Office of Ocean and Coastal
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announced that it was considering permitting oil and gas
exploration in the area of the proposed Olympic Coast sanctuary,
leading Washington Representative Jolene Unsoeld to charge that
"the administration has a single focus, and that's drilling for oil
wherever they can." 119 In 1992, Representative Studds expressed
consternation that the administration was delaying designation of
Stellwagen Bank because of a reluctance to prohibit gravel
mining.
120
By the latter part of Bush's term, the agency primarily
responsible for the delays no longer was NOAA. Representative
Panetta praised NOAA for its work on Monterey Bay,1 2' and
Representative Studds gave it similar credit for its efforts
surrounding Stellwagen Bank. 122  Similarly, inadequate funding
Management, NOAA).
1t9 Schaefer, supra note 116, at A5.
120 138 CONG. REc. H7230 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992). Rep. Studds charged
that:
a philosophical debate within the administration now threatens to kill
this designation-a debate over the legitimacy of leaving Stellwagen
Bank open to offshore sand and gravel mining.
The fact that the Department of the Interior would even consider the
possibility of sand and gravel mining in a highly productive marine
ecosystem is nothing short of ludicrous. Stellwagen Bank is sand and
gravel-mine it, and you destroy the very reason for establishing this
sanctuary in the first place. NOAA's draft environmental impact
statement for the Stellwagen Bank Sanctuary recognized how harmful
mining could be to this ecosystem, and the Department of the Interior
should do the same. This ridiculous debate must be stopped here and
now.
Id.
1 Rep. Panetta argued that the problem was OMB and the Departments of
Interior, and Energy, and that "NOAA has basically gone through the process
and made the recommendation. It is just that the other departments have now
indicated their objections." Oversight Hearing, supra note 118, at 9. Marc Del
Piero of the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary had even stronger praise
for NOAA's efforts: "NOAA has done a yeoman's job, a remarkable job in
cooperating with local governmental officials, representatives of the marine
science community, representatives of the Chambers of Commerce,
representatives from the fishing industry, representatives from state government,
as well as local government." Id. at 30.
122 138 CONG. REc. H7230 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992).
In 1990, NOAA finally began the process of making Stellwagen Bank a
sanctuary-with support from virtually the entire Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. NOAA has so far done an excellent job of moving
Stellwagen toward sanctuary status, and I would like to take this
opportunity to thank them for their efforts.
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and the complications of a complex designation process, while
perhaps responsible for some delay, ultimately were not applying
the brakes, for designations languished even after the
administrative process was all but complete.' 23  Instead, active
opposition from the Department of Energy, the Department of the
Interior-particularly the Minerals Management Service-and, to
a lesser extent, skepticism from the White House's Office of
Management and Budget were keeping the program in check.
24
Nevertheless, NOAA also faced continuing internal problems.
A 1991 government-funded study found that its management
lacked vision and suggested that it had failed to acknowledge its
own management mission. 25 The Sanctuary Program, the study
found, had been managed as "the runt of the NOAA litter.' ' 126 The
study recommended drastic changes in NOAA's management,
urging that NOAA acknowledge and accept its managerial
responsibilities rather than considering itself simply a research
body ill-suited for management. 127 It urged that annual funding for
the program be drastically increased-from then-current levels of
around four million dollars per year to around thirty million. 128 It
condemned the lack of vision for the program, and recommended
that NOAA set as a goal the development of a comprehensive
system of sanctuaries representative of all of the major ecological
123 NOAA's representative did attribute some delay to these factors. See The
Current Status and Future Needs of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's National Marine Sanctuary Program: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Oceanography, Great Lakes and the Outer Continental Shelf,
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env 't, and Subcomm.
on Oceanography and Great Lakes of the House Comm. on Merch. Marine and
Fisheries, 102d Cong. 40-41 (1991) (statement of Trudy Coxe, Director, Office
of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, NOAA). Nevertheless, the length
of time that these proposals languished in the process, often after scientific
studies were completed and support had coalesced, suggests an unwillingness to
pull the trigger on designation rather than an inability to complete the process.
124 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 118, at 9-10 (statement of Rep.
Panetta) (charging that OMB and DOI were obstructing the program, and
arguing that the Minerals Management Service has a "knee jerk reaction" to any
threat to its ability to offer mineral leases); supra notes 119-120.
125 See MARINE SANCTUARIES REVIEW TEAM REPORT, supra note 63, at 12-14.
"In the past, NOAA's administration of the Marine Sanctuaries Program has
lacked leadership, focus, resources and visibility, and the program has suffered
for it." Id. at 12.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 12-13.
128 Id. at 18.
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zones in U.S. coastal waters. 129 It also criticized NOAA's lack of a
clear mission, arguing that it should re-envision the program as
fundamentally conservation-oriented.
130
2. Congress Takes the Lead
In response to this perceived "programmatic lassitude, 13'
Congress took more dramatic steps to push the process along. In
1990, in response to several groundings in the Florida Keys,
Congress designated the Florida Keys National Marine
Sanctuary. 132 This was done without asking NOAA to complete
the statutory review process. At 2,800 nautical square miles, the
Sanctuary was the largest yet designated. 33  Its size was not
unprecedented-the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary,
although smaller, was of the same scale' 34-but the method of
designation was. For the first time, Congress acted as more than
an external trigger to the normal designation process, instead
creating a sanctuary on its own initiative and entirely outside of the
statutorily defined designation process.
Congress followed this effort with the 1992 reauthorization of
the NMSA. 135 In addition to reauthorizing the Act, Congress
designated the Hawaiian Humpback Whale National Marine
Sanctuary, 136 the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary, 137 and
... See id. at 12, 14, 30. The report proposed the following vision statement:
By the year 2000, the National Marine Sanctuaries Program will
manage a comprehensive and integrated system of the nation's most
significant marine areas. This management will be based on
ecologically sound, well-researched principles of resource protection
and sustainable use and will focus as well on improving public
understanding of the nation's marine heritage and in extending sound
marine resource management principles to areas beyond sanctuary
boundaries.
Id. at 14.
130 Id. (urging that the primary program goals should be biological and
cultural heritage protection).
131 Oversight Hearing, supra note 118, at I (statement of Rep. Foglietta).
132 Pub. L. No. 101-605, 104 Stat. 3089 (1990) (as amended by Pub. L. 102-
587, §§ 2206, 2209, 106 Stat. 5053, 5054 (1992)). See also SEN. REP. No. 102-
411, at 2 (1992).
133 See supra tbl. 1.
134 See id.
135 National Marine Sanctuaries Program Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102-
587, 106 Stat. 5039 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445 (2000)).
136 Id. §§ 2301-2308, 106 Stat. at 5055-59.
137 Id. § 2203, 106 Stat. at 5048-49.
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the Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary,1 38 and required
an oil and gas drilling ban for the Olympic Coast National Marine
Sanctuary. 139  These designations were unlike the Florida Keys
designation, however, for each of the three designated sanctuaries
had been considered prior to congressional designation. 140  The
Humpback Whale sanctuary was originally recommended by a
scientist in 1977, and had gone through much of the designation
process before NOAA, but at the request of the state, NOAA
removed it from the list of potential sanctuaries in 1984.1
4 1
Consideration began again in 1989 and 1990, and the sanctuary
was included in the 1992 reauthorization bill after the state of
Hawaii, now a supporter of the sanctuary, presented Congress with
testimony favoring designation. 142 Monterey Bay had a similarly
long, though even more contentious, history, 143 and Stellwagen
Bank had been under active consideration for over a decade before
its designation. 144  As a result, members of Congress could
accurately characterize its actions as "finalizing the lengthy and
tedious designation process where the merits of specific sites are
clear and where these sites require immediate management
consideration."1
45
Throughout this period, Congress's actions and rhetoric were
characterized by a remarkable degree of unanimity. Stated
Id. § 2202, 106 Stat. at 5048.I d. § 2207, 106 Stat. at 5053; see also 138 CONG. REC. H7230 (daily ed.
Au . 3, 1992) (statement of Rep. Studds).
See 138 CONG. REC. H7230 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Studds); S. REP. No. 102-411 at 2-3 (1992).
141 See CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENv'T, supra note 58, at 90-93; NOAA,
THE HISTORY OF THE SANCTUARY, at http://www.hihwnms.nos.noaa.gov/about/
sanctuary history.html (last revised Mar. 10, 2003).
42 See CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 94; Hawaiian
Island Humpback Whale National Marine Sanctuary, 62 Fed. Reg. 14,799 (Mar.
28, 1997) ("The Sanctuary was designated by Congress in 1992.").
143 See Kenneth J. Garcia, Monterey Bay Refuge Exceeds Expectations;
However, Environmentalists Worry About Plan's Loopholes, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
14, 1992, at Al ("Since a plan to create the Monterey Bay National Marine
Sanctuary first surfaced 15 years ago, it has been ripped apart by conservation
groups, torpedoed by commercial fishermen, battled by oil lobbyists and nearly
sunk by the Reagan administration.").
'44 See 138 CONG. REC. H7230 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Studds) ("For almost a decade, Stellwagen Bank languished on the back burners
of NOAA's National Marine Sanctuary Program.").
141 138 CONG. REC. H7232 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Hertel).
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opposition to designations was almost non-existent. Conservatives
and liberals alike embraced the program; Representative Don
Young of Alaska was repeatedly involved in facilitating sanctuary
designations and reauthorizations of the Act, 146 and Senator Phil
Gramm praised the Flower Garden Banks Coral Reef,147 while
Representatives Leon Panetta148 and Gerry Studds, 149 and Senator
John Kerry,1 50 among others, were strong advocates of programs in
their home states. Indeed, Studds once remarked on this bipartisan
support, "I do not think in all of those 22 years of the time that I
served on that committee I ever heard a partisan observation
except as sort of a lighthearted aside."
' '5 1
The nature of the designations may provide some explanation
for the universal support. Flower Garden Banks is tiny, and even
oil industry spokesmen seemed quite acquiescent to its inclusion in
the sanctuary system. 152 Likewise, despite some calls for Alaskan
146 In the words of Representative Studds:
We have worked together, Don Young and I and the other Members
here for the last few years, for a very long time....
... I think it was [a] common understanding on [the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries] which brought together people as
disparate, for example, as Don Young and myself.
... [W]e astonished many people over the years by the closeness of our
working, our personal relationship and our friendship, and it was I think
because we both understood the Earth and the ocean because it was part
intimately of our respective lives.
142 CONG. REc. H9978 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1996) (statement of Rep. Studds). See
also 138 CONG. REc. H7231 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992) (statement of Rep. Young).
147 137 CONG. REC. S18,761 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Gramm).
148 Congressman Panetta gave impassioned testimony about the need for
further protection of the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary. See, e.g.,
Oversight Hearing, supra note 118, at 3-9 (statement of Rep. Panetta).
141 Studds' support of the Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary (now
called the Gerry Studds Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary) was
similarly tireless. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Nat'l Ocean Policy Study of the
Sen. Comm. On Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 102d Cong. 10-11 (1992); 138
CONG. REC. H7230 (daily ed. Aug. 3,1992) (statement of Rep. Studds).
150 See 142 CONG. REc. S 11,803 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kerry).
151 142 CONG. REc. H9978 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Studds).
152 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations,
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation, and Subcomm. on
Oceanography and Great Lakes of the House Comm. on Merch. Marine and
Fisheries, 102d Cong. 16 (1992) (statement of Robert B. Stewart, President,
National Ocean Industries Association); 137 CONG. REc. H 1,028 (daily ed.
Nov. 23, 1991) (statement of Rep. Jones) ("[The Flower Garden Banks]
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sanctuaries, 153 Representative Young never needed to take the
House floor to comment on a serious designation proposal for his
home state. These possible explanations, however, do not change
the fact that the sanctuary program enjoyed widespread and
enthusiastic rhetorical congressional support.
By 1992, Congress was no longer faced with a completely
opposed administration. The Bush administration had succeeded
in finalizing the designation of Flower Garden Banks,' 54 and
embraced the largest possible geographic area proposal for the
Monterey Bay sanctuary. 155 In 1990, Dr. Silvia Earle, a prominent
oceanographer, assumed the reins at NOAA,'56 and NOAA's 1992
hearing testimony reflects the enthusiasm of a reinvigorated
program. Jennifer Joy Wilson, NOAA's Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and Atmosphere, described NOAA's enlarged staff,
increased budget requests, endorsement of the largest alternative
for Monterey Bay, and projected continuation of the designation
trend. 157 The record seems to tell the story of a vigorous, thriving
program, with NOAA now beginning to embrace a facilitative role
in developing a base of information to support designations with
Congress, through legislation, supplying the finishing touches.
E. Phase V. Clinton
This enthusiasm about designations appeared likely to carry
over into the Clinton administration, but early results were
followed by a period of quiet. In 1994, NOAA finalized the
designation of the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary.158
The flurry of designations then came to a halt, however; NOAA
designation is not controversial. It is supported by the oil and gas industries.").153 See Blumm & Blumstein, supra note 8, at 50,025-26 (discussing President
Carter's directive urging protection of Alaskan waters, and the rush of
nominations that followed).
154 137 CONG. REC. HlI,028 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991) (statements of Rep.
Ortiz). See also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
155 See Hearing Before the Merch. Marine and Fisheries Comm., and
Subcomm. on Oceanography, Great Lakes, and the Outer Continental Shelf, and
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env', 102d Cong. 37
(1992) [hereinafter Merch. Marine Hearings] (written statement of Jennifer Joy
Wilson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, NOAA).
156 William J. Broad, Sea Sanctuaries Expand in U.S., Offering Refuge to a
Riot of Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1994, at C12.
157 See Merch. Marine Hearings, supra note 155, at 37.
158 Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, Final Rule, 59
Fed. Reg. 24,586, 24,603 (May 11, 1994).
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did not designate its next sanctuary-Thunder Bay in Michigan-
until 2000, and even that designation was more symbolic than
protective, building upon already existing state protections.
59
The program was not inactive, however, during the Clinton
years. The new designations left NOAA with many new
sanctuaries to manage, and NOAA now faced the difficult task of
actually implementing management schemes. As a result, during
the Clinton administration NOAA focused on improving
management of the existing system, which began to evolve from
an aspiration into a functional government program. The program
hired staff, purchased office equipment, developed community
outreach programs, and updated management plans. 6 ° Efforts at
designating no-take marine reserves within the Florida Keys and
Channel Islands sanctuaries generated enormous controversy and
required extensive NOAA involvement, although this involvement
resulted in little success.' 6 1  NOAA's website trumpets the
significance of the Ocean Conference attended by President
Clinton and Vice President Gore in 1998, "the International Year
of the Ocean," and the launching of a deep sea exploration
program for the sanctuaries.162 The program began developing a
sense of mission, with young, idealistic, and conservation-oriented
professionals gradually taking many of its staff positions.'
63
Perhaps most importantly, the program budget grew significantly,
doubling between 1990 and 1993 and again between 1993 and
1998, allowing for improved planning and basic operations at
existing sanctuaries.'
64
The designation process, however, came nearly to a halt. The
59 See supra tbl. 1; About Thunder Bay Sanctuary, supra note 60 (noting the
creation of The Thunder Bay Underwater Preserve by Michigan in the 1980s,
well prior to NOAA designation).
161 CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at ix ("Perhaps
unavoidably, the program has spent a great deal of energy in the past 10 years on
planning and building its institutional capacity."), 2 ("The sanctuaries are
beginning to find effective ways to establish a physical presence on the water,
establish and enforce regulations, nourish public understanding of the sites and
the threats they face, and encourage research.").
161 See Brax, supra note 8, at 10-14 (providing a detailed summary and
critique of the process of designating these reserve areas).
162 See National Marine Sanctuaries Timeline, supra note 78.
163 CTR. FOR THE EcoN. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 18 ("Most of the
staff, especially in the Washington headquarters, are young professionals who
are deeply committed to the program and to marine conservation.").
"6 Id. at 31.
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only significant activity between 1994 and 2000 was the removal
of Norfolk Canyon, off the coast of Virginia, from active
consideration, 165 and the abandonment of the possibility of a Puget
Sound sanctuary after the State of Washington, in the face of
intense and well-organized local resistance, withdrew its
support.166 As the Clinton years drew to a close, there remained
little clamor for further designations; a major outside review of the
program concluded that creating an effective bureaucracy capable
of providing some level of real management at the existing
sanctuaries should be NOAA's first priority.' 67 Given NOAA's
persistent lack of funds, the study concluded that further
designations would be unwise.'
68
The administration's quiet appears to have been matched by
calm on Capitol Hill. Congress reauthorized the Act in 1996 and
again in 2000, but with few changes and minimal hearings or
debate. 69 The legislative histories of the reauthorizations contain
no indication of frustration with the lack of further designations.
170
Despite acknowledgment that only two sanctuaries were under
active consideration, Congress did nothing to spur the process,
instead focusing its efforts on allowing the sanctuaries to make
more money through trademarks and logos.' 7 1  Congress did
increase program budgets throughout this period, 172 but appears to
have sought no expansion of the sanctuary system. Rather, in
165 National Marine Sanctuaries Timeline, supra note 78; supra Table 1.
166 CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 31.
167 Id. at ix-x.
168 The study found that:
[t]his is probably not the right time to create more sanctuaries. Perhaps
if Congress were to increase the budget and clout of the program
dramatically, the program could handle additional sites, but no one is
talking about such a step now.... [A]t this point, the program cannot
afford to spend its resources on a long, expensive process to add more
sites.
Id. at 34.
161 See NOAA, NMSA History, supra note 14, at 4-5 (describing minor
changes to the Act in 1996 and 2000); 142 CONG. REc. 11,803-04 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Kerry) (describing the reauthorization as "straightforward"
and making "only minor changes to the Sanctuaries Act"); 142 CONG. REC.
9977-78 (1996) (statements of Reps. Farr and Studds).
170 See 142 CONG. REC. 11,803 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (providing
little evidence of controversy); 142 CONG. REC. 9977-78 (1996) (statements of
Reps. Farr and Studds).
171 142 CONG. REc. 9977 (1996) (statement of Rep. Farr).
172 CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 31.
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2000, Congress added a provision to the NMSAprohibiting further
designations unless NOAA demonstrated the existence of adequate
resources to manage the current set of sanctuaries.'
73
This period of quiet occurred for a confluence of reasons.
Perhaps most importantly, the designations of the early nineties
left NOAA with significantly expanded managerial
responsibilities, and concern grew both within the agency and in
Congress that designation of additional sanctuaries might
compromise NOAA's ability to manage the existing system.'
74
The program's budget had expanded, but until the very end of the
Clinton years it failed to approach the $30 million called for by the
Marine Sanctuaries Review Team, 175 and critics continued to
allege that the program was plagued by underfunding. 176  The
program bureaucracy may have steadily developed throughout the
nineties, but sanctuaries were still forced to use creative measures
to ensure any level of protection, and often were almost
completely dependent upon voluntary community efforts to
effectively manage their resources.' 77  Sanctuaries that lacked
funding and were unable to forge such community ties remained
almost completely unmanaged.1
78
173 NOAA, NMSA History, supra note 14, at 5.
174 See Interview with Richard Charter, supra note 101 (describing reasons for
the decreased focus on the designation process).
175 See supra note 128 and accompanying text; 142 CONG. REc. 11,803
(1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (indicating that Congress would be providing
$45.5 million in funding over the next three years, or approximately $15 million
per year); CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 32.
116 See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 11-12
(comparing the budget-per-square mile of the sanctuary program to those of the
Forest Service and the National Park Service).
177 Id. at 16 ("The sanctuaries need to establish a physical presence on the
water, both to enforce sanctuary regulations and to keep track of natural changes
and human activities that might threaten sanctuary resources. To do this,
sanctuaries usually find it necessary to work with other government agencies or
with non-profit organizations."). The report provides extensive discussion of the
ways in which the sanctuaries lack monitoring and enforcement resources and
have sought to compensate by mobilizing community support. In typical
examples, the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary relies on trained
volunteers who conduct "interpretive enforcement," and the Hawaiian
Humpback Whale National Marine Sanctuary relies on the efforts of "a small
cadre of 'condo commandos'-retired people with telescopes on the balconies of
their condominiums-[who] watch for whales and call the sanctuary office when
they think that whale-watchers or researchers are harassing the whales." Id.
178 Id. at 11 ("[S]ome sanctuaries have not been able to develop good working
relations with other agencies or to overcome local opposition. Lacking resources
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The designation procedure also had become more complex at
the same time support was declining. Increasing scientific
knowledge about oceans provided increasingly sophisticated critics
of the program with far greater leverage for both political and legal
challenges to the designation process.179 As a result, the relatively
thin and straightforward Environmental Impact Statements (EISs)
of the late seventies were replaced by gigantic, exhaustive, and
highly expensive records.18 0  This increasingly daunting process
might have been overcome through strong political backing, but
the program lacked an executive champion. President Clinton, like
Presidents Bush and Reagan before him, showed little interest in
the program. 181 As Congress moved to the right through the
1990s, executive support that could have been crucial in
continuing the designation process instead was largely absent.
At the same time that governmental support for the program
was again waning, observers were beginning to raise concerns
about the level of protection offered by the sanctuary program.
First, observers noted the inability of sanctuaries to translate paper
regulations into actual protection. 182 In addition, many critics had
come to believe those regulations, even if enforced, would still be
inadequate. The program had been used primarily as a protective
measure against oil and gas exploration and other threats of
physical destruction,' 83 but critics started to suggest that additional
and public support, these are sanctuaries without defenses."). Monitor National
Marine Sanctuary, for example, lacks the funds necessary to stop the further
deterioration of the Monitor wreck, due in large part to an accident involving a
fisherman's anchor. Id. at 7, 27. Stellwagen Bank, Fagatele Bay, and Cordell
Bank are, according to the report, "[c]learly... skeletal operations." Id. at 27.
In conclusion, the report states that "[t]hough it would be difficult and perhaps
embarrassing to analyze the capacity of each sanctuary to respond to such
threats, NOAA would be wise to attempt such an exercise." Id.
171 Interview with Richard Charter, supra note 101. Charter also suggests that
increasing aggressiveness and stridency of "wise use" movements, particularly
around Puget Sound in Washington, made NOAA's designation task increasingly
difficult. Id.
180 Id. (describing the difference between the two-inch-thick EISs for the
Channel Islands and Point Reyes-Farallon NMS designations in 1979 and the
approximately five-foot-thick pile of documentation compiled to support the
designation of no-take zones in the Channel Islands in the mid- 1990s).
"' Id.; but cf supra note 162 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.183 See CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 14, 16-17
(describing the threats that led to sanctuary protection: oil and gas on the West
Coast, offshore development and mining at Stellwagen Bank, and ship
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protections-particularly from fishing-would be needed if
sanctuary status were to provide true protection of natural
resources. 184 These concerns may have caused environmentalists'
enthusiasm about the designation process to wane.1 85 In addition,
the additional protections had the potential to drive enormous
wedges between local fishers, who had previously been supportive
of many designations, and who had often received promises from
legislators that the sanctuaries would never impose such fishing
regulations,' 86 and other designation advocates.187 The resulting
debates compromised the political weight behind the designation
process and set the stage for another data-intensive and
complicated, and therefore expensive, scientific debate, thus
creating another potential bar to sanctuary designation.'88 In both
the Channel Islands and the Florida Keys, battles over no-take
zones took on almost explosive intensity,' 89 providing clear
warning signals to any politician wishing to pursue what
previously had been clear political coups.
groundings in the Florida Keys).
184 See id. at 7-8 (describing threats to sanctuaries not currently addressed by
the NMSA, such as sewage seepage from land development in Florida Keys, and
potential oil spills near Stellwagen Bank, Flower Gardens, and Channel Islands);
Brax, supra note 8, at 92-93, 127-29; Interview with Richard Charter, supra note
101 (describing what he believed were important threats to the sanctuaries); Sally
Deneen, Unsafe Sanctuaries, E/THE ENVTL. MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1998,
http://www.emagazine.com/september-october_1998/0998currsanc.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2003).
185 Richard Charter, for example, was more concerned about improved
management of existing sanctuaries than the designation of new sanctuaries.
Interview with Richard Charter, supra note 101.
186 CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 18 ("All along the
West Coast, in Hawaii, and in Massachusetts, the local members of Congress
promised that sanctuaries would never regulate fishing. NOAA wrote this
promise into the initial sanctuary management plans.").
187 For example, Zeke Grader of the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's
Associations (PCFFA) had supported the Monterey Bay National Marine
Sanctuary. See Garcia, supra note 144, at A15 (describing the alliance,
developed when conservation groups agreed not to oppose continued commercial
and recreational fishing within the sanctuary, of commercial fishermen with
conservation groups in opposing offshore drilling). The PCFFA now, however,
is skeptical of the push for marine reserves, and many other fishing groups are
extraordinarily strident in their opposition to any further fishing regulation.
Brax, supra note 8, at 99.
188 Cf supra note 179 and accompanying text.
189 See Brax, supra note 8, at 105-13.
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F. Phase VI Hawaiian Reef Designation
In December 2000, however, Clinton appeared to place the
program on the verge of another revitalization. Executive Order
13,178 directed NOAA to begin designating a new sanctuary to be
known as the Northwest Hawaiian Coral Reef Ecosystem
Reserve. 190 As described by the Order, the reserve is to be
gargantuan in scale; it will encompass most coral reefs in U.S.
waters and, at approximately 99,500 nautical square miles, and
will dwarf all of the other marine sanctuaries combined.' 91 The
reserve is also to be managed differently than its predecessors. In
addition to the standard prohibitions on oil and gas exploration,
92
the Order directs NOAA to regulate fishing within the reserve'
93
and to use a scientific management approach based on the
precautionary principle. 94  Other elements of the Order are
reminiscent of prior sanctuary designation and management
procedures; the Order is explicit about requiring inclusion of a
diverse set of stakeholders in the process of developing a
management plan. 95 Nevertheless, the Order directs NOAA to
undertake something grand and unprecedented.
The future of the reserve, however, is uncertain. Clinton and
Congress did substantially increase the Marine Sanctuaries
Program budget.196  And in January, 2001, Clinton issued
Executive Order 13,196, which finalized some of the Reserve
Protection Measures proposed in Executive Order 13,178.197
190 Exec. Order No. 13,178, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,903, 76,904 (Dec. 7, 2000).
191 See id.; Matt Chapman, Note, Northwest Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef
Ecosystem Reserve: Ephemeral Protection, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 347, 348-49
(2002).
192 Exec. Order No. 13,178, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,607.
193 Id. at 76,907.
194 Id. at 76,904 ("The Reserve shall be managed using available science and
applying a precautionary approach with resource protection favored when there
is a lack of information regarding any given activity, to the extent not contrary to
law.").
195 Id. at 79,606 (specifying the membership of the reserve's advisory
council).
196 Bruce Jackson, National Marine Sanctuary System Receives Budget
Increase, SANCTUARY WATCH, Feb./Mar. 2001, at 1, available at
http://sanctuaries.nos.noaa.gov:80/news/sanctuarywatch/SanctuaryWatchVol2No
1.pdf; Sarah Mitchell, National Marine Sanctuaries Gain Historic Funding,
SANCTUARY WATCH, Jan. 2000, at 1, available at
http://sanctuaries.nos.noaa.gov/news/sanctuarywatch/SanctuaryWatchVo 1_1 .pdf,
197 Exec. Order No. 13,196, 66 Fed. Reg. 7395 (Jan. 23, 2001).
[Volume I11
NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES ACT
Shortly thereafter, however, he left office. The Bush
administration immediately placed the reserve under review, 98 and
its commitment to exploitation of public lands may not bode well
for continued support.1 99 In addition, as the protracted histories of
so many other designations suggest, turning the Clinton
administration's initiative into an actual sanctuary may require
years of determined effort, especially if that designation will
require heavier regulation of fishermen.20 0 In the absence of such
support, the designation process may wither, or could even be
revoked by a further Executive Order. 20' In short, Clinton's orders
represent only the first step on a potentially long journey.
G. The Current System
In 1972, Congress drafted a law ostensibly intended to lead to
a comprehensive system for protecting the nation's ocean waters.
Thirty years later, the vision remains partially and unevenly
realized.
The Marine Sanctuaries Program has had major
accomplishments. It has functioned as a popular and effective
limit on oil and gas drilling, particularly along the California
coast. 2  It has been similarly effective in protecting other limited
areas from selected threats; Stellwagen Bank is intact, unmined,
and without floating casinos, 20 3 and reefs in the Florida Keys are
better protected from shipping traffic. 20 4  All of this protection,
198 Hawai'i Coral Reef Network, Reef Events & News, at
http://www.coralreefnetwork.com/network/events.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2003).
199 See ENVTL. DEF., COMMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CONCERNING
THE FEBRUARY, 2002 DRAFT RESERVE OPERATIONS PLAN FOR THE
NORTHWESTERN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS CORAL REEF ECOSYSTEM RESERVE (May
14, 2002), http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/2056_NWHI
DROP.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2003); see generally Weston Kosova, What's
Gail Norton Trying to Hide?, OUTSIDE, June 2002 ("When Norton arrived in
Washington last year, President Bush gave her a clear mission on the economic
front: The government controls a lot of land. There's oil and coal and natural gas
under it. Get it."), http://outsideonline.com/outside/toc/200206.adp (last visited
Apr. 21, 2003).
200 See supra notes 115-116, 184-189 and accompanying text.
201 Chapman, supra note 191, at 3.55-58 (providing a thorough account of the
Orders' tenuous status).
202 See, e.g., supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
203 See CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 109-10.
204 Id. at 78.
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moreover, grew out of an uncommon level of bipartisan support
and cooperation.2 °5 The program also offers states a source of
pride and communities a potentially defining connection to their
surrounding environment. 20 6 Finally, it has provided a platform for
the potential development of future protection schemes.
20 7
These accomplishments, however, fall short in several ways
of the comprehensive vision Congress set forth in 1972. Huge and
distinctive areas of ocean remain unprotected. Only off of four
states-California, Hawaii, Florida, and Washington-has the
program succeeded in protecting large areas of coast, and even off
those states, other than California, only a relatively small
percentage of the coastal area is protected.20 8 Vast areas, including
the Alaskan coast, the rich fishing grounds off Maine, and the East
Coast from Cape Cod south to Gray's Reef in Georgia, are almost
completely devoid of sanctuaries. 209 Thus the program is still well
short of the goal set forth in the 1991 Marine Sanctuaries Team
Report-that representative sanctuaries should be established in all
of the United States' marine ecological zones. 210  Instead of
providing a comprehensive system of protection, the program has
developed, at least in the geographic scale and placement of its
protections, into a marine equivalent of the national park system,
protecting spectacular but, for the most part, small and widely
dispersed areas.2'
The program's small geographic scale may fall short of what
Congress originally envisioned, but the management failures
205 See supra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
206 For example, both the New England Aquarium and the Monterey Bay
Aquarium devote exhibits to their nearby sanctuaries, and other sanctuaries have
established educational programs for local children. Monterey Bay Aquarium,
Habitats Path, at http://www.mbayaq.org/efc/hp.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2003);
NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM, AQUARIUM TOUR, at http://www.neaq.org/vtour/
immerse.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2003); CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND ENV'T, supra
note 58, at 15.
207 See Brax, supra note 8, at 82-93 (describing the Marine Sanctuary
Program as a potential platform for developing a more protective system of
marine reserves, but also discussing the potential limitations created by the
NMSA's multiple use approach).
208 See, e.g., supra tbl. 1.
209 The Monitor National Marine Sanctuary is on the East Coast, but it is
rather tiny. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
210 MARINE SANCTUARIES REVIEW TEAM REPORT, supra note 63, at 30.
211 But cf supra note 176 and accompanying text (noting the lack of funding
of marine sanctuaries program relative to the National Parks Service).
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within the reserves pose a potentially greater problem. In
designating the reserves, Congress appeared to envision something
akin to an idealized version of the national forest system, in which
multiple uses would be served but no use would compromise the
integrity of the unique resources to be protected.212 Instead, the
program has developed as a system of primarily single-purpose
reservations, in which a selected group of threats are addressed but
other uses-particularly fishing-continue basically
unrestrained.213 The balancing originally envisioned by Congress
generally has not occurred; uses are either unregulated or flatly
prohibited.214 In practice, a lack of funding means that even the
modest level of regulation called for on paper is rarely achieved.
21 5
As a result, as Congressman Keith perhaps prophetically noted
thirty years ago, the term "sanctuary" is a misnomer, and that the
is 216sanctuary system is desperately in need of greater protection.
The current system is also notable for the unexpected manner
of its designations. Of the current sanctuaries, only one-
Monitor-was designated without some sort of pressure from
Congress or the Executive. At times, the pressure required was
relatively minimal-Jimmy Carter's address was, relative to the
congressional interventions of the late 80's and early 90's, a gentle
prod, and the process of designating the Channel Island, Point
Reyes-Farallon, Looe Key, and Gray's Reef Sanctuaries probably
was reasonably close to what the NMSA's drafters envisioned.
217
Most designations, however, have required far more active
intervention. NOAA simply never has created significant marine
sanctuaries on its own initiative.
212 See supra Part II(B).
213 Interview with Richard Charter, supra note 101. Charter stressed that
sanctuary advocates never foresaw the risk posed by human consumptive uses,
and that they would have argued for more stringent protections if they had
realized how heavily fishing would impact the sanctuaries. Id.
214 This absence of balancing is most evident in the California sanctuaries,
where oil and gas exploration is flatly prohibited but fishing is basically
unregulated. See also CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND ENV'T, supra note 58, at 10
(noting that, "sanctuaries ... have difficulty reconciling protection within the
concept of multiple use").
215 See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
216 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
217 See generally supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
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III
LESSONS OF HISTORY
The Marine Sanctuary Program has had a difficult history;
despite apparent congressional and public support, protection
remains spotty, and never has developed in quite the manner
envisioned by the National Marine Sanctuaries Act's original
drafters. In part, these problems have resulted from political
circumstances-for twelve years executives were far more
sympathetic to the oil and gas industries than to the sanctuary
program. Many of the program's failings, however, can be traced
directly to the original statute. The NMSA appears to be
classically symbolic legislation,218 declaring grand goals without
providing the means to ensure that those goals are ever achieved.
This Part draws on that difficult history and describes several of
the Act's basic problems.
A. Wrong Agent for a Difficult Task
Perhaps the greatest challenge faced by NOAA is also the
most obvious. Setting aside land or water for protection is
extremely difficult politically. The controversies surrounding
Clinton's eleventh-hour initiatives, from the Roadless Rule219 to
M See generally John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17
ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990). Dwyer criticizes Section 112 of the Clean Air Act,
which mandated exceedingly rapid elimination of hazardous air pollution that
posed greater than a threshold risk to human health, as symbolic, arguing that
legislators mandated an unachievable goal in full awareness that the task they
delegated to EPA was impossible. He further argues that such symbolic
legislation then undermines the regulatory process by heightening suspicion and
providing both sides in subsequent struggles with disincentives to compromise.
Id. at 236-250.
The NMSA is, in a sense, the exact opposite of Section 112 of the pre-
1990 Clean Air Act, for, although it too states broad goals, it provides no
mandated mechanism, rather than an unworkably strong mechanism, for
achieving those goals. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Nevertheless,
the result is the same-Congress made a strong symbolic statement, and it was
up to an agency to sort out the ensuing mess.
"' See Eric Pianin, Administration Revisits Forest Land Rules; Paper
Industry, Western Governors Want Protective Regulation Scaled Back, WASH.
POST, July 7, 2001, at A2; Stop Demagoguing - Roadless Initiative was Overdue,
GREAT FALLS TRIB., Jan. 15, 2001, http://www.greatfallstribune.com/news/
stories/20010115/opinion/186012.html; News: President Clinton Unveils
Strategy to Protect USFS Roadless Areas (Oct. 14, 1999), at
http://www.fs.fed.us/forums/eco/get/ew/nr-agenda21-forum/6.html.
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the National Monument designations, 220 are only the latest
illustrations of a commonplace problem-reserving any kind of
resource can lead to intense controversy. When the areas to be set
aside are potentially huge, as many potential marine reserves have
been, the possibilities for controversy grow accordingly.
Moreover, any administrative agency is likely to be well aware
that setting aside an area is only the beginning of its troubles-
refereeing the often litigious battles between environmentalists,
extractive industry, and higher-impact recreational users is an
ongoing headache for almost every land management agency.
Perhaps as a result of this difficulty, Congress has never
attempted elsewhere to delegate responsibility for reservations to
an administrative agency. National parks are designated by
congressional legislation,22 1 as are wilderness areas 222 and wild and
scenic rivers. 223 Congress or the President, not the Bureau of Land
Management or the Forest Service, also established most other
reservations of public lands from extractive use.224 The President
designates national monuments, subject to congressional
acquiescence. z25 The agencies responsible for managing these
areas have significant planning responsibilities, and their plans can
sometimes accomplish the practical equivalent of a withdrawal.226
Those plans, however, are generally developed in accordance with
220 See Sanjay Ranchod, Note, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting
Ecosystems with the Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 535, 577-78
(2001).
221 See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAW 140, 144 (5th ed. 2002).
222 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132 (1994) (requiring agency heads
to inventory potential wilderness areas within their jurisdiction, but reserving for
Congress final decision-making authority); COGGINS ET AL., supra note 221, at
1110.
223 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1273 (1994) (again
requiring agency input, but reserving the final power to designate rivers to
Congress except when the state through which the river flows submits a
nomination application to the Secretary of the Interior); COGGINS ET AL., supra
note 221, at 1084-85.
224 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 221, at 137, 140-41. Both the Forest Service
and the Fish and Wildlife Service have at times been funded to acquire additional
lands. Id. at 138-39. However, acquiring lands and compensating the existing
owners is likely to be significantly less controversial than changing the use of
lands without offering existing users any compensation for their lost interests.
225 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 221, at 141; Brax, supra note 8, at 125;
Ranchod, supra note 220, at 537.
226 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 221, at 345-47.
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detailed planning statutes that provide substantive and procedural
directives far more specific than those offered in the NMSA.227
What Congress sought to do in the NMSA, therefore, was
unprecedented. Providing only vague and general guidance, it
granted an agency the authority to set aside and develop
management plans for potentially vast areas of ocean.
The potential problems, in hindsight, seem obvious. A
relatively small agency like NOAA has little leverage when
dealing with potentially irate opponents to sanctuary
designations.228 Perhaps more importantly, it has relatively little
clout compared to more powerful actors within the executive
branch-most notably the State Department, the Department of the
Interior, and the Office of Management and Budget-and thus not
surprisingly is overmatched when forced to do battle with these
agencies over resource management decisions.
229
Faced with such opponents and the potential for intense public
opposition, NOAA's potentially strongest weapon, if it chose to
push forward with designations, was the integrity of its scientific
expertise. 230 Designating any kind of protected area, however, has
always been intensely political, and no amount of science can
make the politics go away.23' Moreover, groups both supporting
and opposing sanctuary designations have grown increasingly
sophisticated at dissecting and critiquing science, negating much
of the leverage potentially generated by NOAA's expertise.
232
NOAA is also weakened by its dependence on others for
227 See, e.g., National Forest Management Act of 1976 § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1604
(2000); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 202, 43 U.S.C. §
1712 (2000); COGGINS ET AL., supra note 221, at 427-28. The level of detail in
these planning statutes provides many potential leverage points for litigators
challenging agency decisions, but it also can provide an agency with political
cover when making potentially unpopular decisions.
228 See CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND ENv'T, supra note 58, at 10 ("The sanctuary
program's influence is also constrained by its small size and location deep inside
NOAA.").
229 See supra notes 120-121.
230 The charisma of the resources it seeks to protect also provides a
compelling reason for designation, of course.
231 See CTR. FOR THE EcON. AND ENV'T, supra note 58, at 40 ("The sanctuary
program is important because it is quite different from almost all of the other
agencies and programs within NOAA. Most of these programs are highly
technical or scientific, whereas the sanctuary program focuses on practical
natural resource management issues and has to work closely with
communities."). See also supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
232 Interview with Richard Charter, supra note 101.
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funding. Congress can designate a national park and appropriate
funds for its management. 233  Likewise, the President has
substantial political power to seek or redirect funds. Nothing in
the NMSA, however, guaranteed NOAA funding increases
following designations.234 Instead, NOAA could only hope that
Congress would respond to designations with greater funding, and
the persistent inadequacy of Congressional allocations would have
made such hopes seem unfounded. For NOAA, designations thus
meant more work without any guarantee of greater funding. Only
a strange bureaucracy would be enticed by such a possibility.
B. Lack of an External Impetus
In addition to delegating the task of designating sanctuaries to
a relatively weak agency, Congress also failed to provide any
significant external pressures for designation. The NMSA created
no specific goals for designations. Instead of requiring that a
certain number of sanctuaries be designated, setting goals for total
area to be protected, or identifying certain habitats for which
NOAA should prioritize its activity, the Act left NOAA with a
235completely unbounded mission. Faced with an incredibly broad
area potentially subject to designation, and with no clear
measuring stick for its success or failure, NOAA tended to err on
the side of modest accomplishment.
The lack of clear goals and standards was compounded by the
Act's failure to clearly define a purpose.2 36 The NMSA directs
NOAA to provide balanced protection of those areas of ocean that
are special. This left the role of defining the policy goals of the
program to an agency that viewed its mission as primarily
scientific and technical, in effect asking the agency to make value
judgments it probably would have preferred to avoid.237 If those
233 See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 221, at 140, 144.
234 See supra Part I.C.
235 See 117 CONG. REc. 30,852 (1971) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("Title
III... authorizes but does not direct.., the Secretary of Commerce to designate
certain areas of the oceans, coastal and other waters.., as marine sanctuaries.");
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
236 See MARINE SANCTUARIES REVIEW TEAM REPORT, supra note 63, at 10
(noting that the Act failed to give any workable meaning to its requirement of
multiple use).
237 See id. at 12-13 (encouraging NOAA to take on its management role more
actively, and noting tension between the management and scientific roles of
agency); see also supra note 231.
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value judgments were challenged, NOAA's strength-the leverage
derived from its scientific expertise-would be of little use.
Similarly, NOAA's critics could only measure its performance
against the vague notion that it was expected to protect something,
and lacked a specific set of statutory standards against which to
measure the value of areas potentially to be designated.
NOAA was unlikely to see broad popular support for many
designations. Even if the need for sanctuaries was great,
degradation of ocean areas is less visible, and therefore less
capable of galvanizing political outrage, than many other
environmental problems. Oil spills, of course, are spectacularly
effective at arousing public will.23 8 Likewise, an oil rig that has
not spilled still looms ominously on the horizon, providing a clear
visual symbol of potential environmental destruction. 239 But many
of the other threats facing sanctuaries-pollution runoff, damage
to the substrate, and, most of all, overfishing-are, to the average
tourist or television viewer, difficult to see, if not invisible.
Likewise, affirmative protection of a sanctuary is hardly visible;
unlike national forests, which typically are demarcated by signs
and, more importantly, usually stand out from the surrounding
landscape because they quite visibly do contain forests, or national
parks, which also are likely to have both a distinct landscape and
plenty of visible signs and promotions, the ocean within a marine
sanctuary is likely to look exactly the same as the surrounding
unprotected ocean, and even the sanctuary's neighbors may be
unaware of its existence.24° In the absence of compelling symbols,
catalyzing support for an otherwise controversial management
decision is a difficult thing to do. Thus, unless a photogenic
ecological disaster occurred or was plainly imminent, NOAA was
unlikely to see any of its designation efforts bolstered by
widespread popular support.
Nor did Congress provide citizens with procedural or
substantive mechanisms to effectively force the designation of
sanctuaries. Other environmental laws include mandatory goals
and citizen suit provisions, allowing the public to force action even
when agencies are reluctant. 24' The Endangered Species Act, for
238 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (describing the effects of the
1969 Santa Barbara oil spill).
239 See NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, supra note 4, at 5-2.
240 CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 58, at 14.
241 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000) (permitting citizen
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example, creates very specific requirements for agency action and,
by allowing private citizen suits to enforce those provisions, leaves
relativoly little discretion for agencies to avoid fulfilling those
242obligations. Private citizens are capable of driving much of the
process, potentially forcing listing of endangered or threatened
species,243 designation of critical habitat,244 and injunctions against
activities potentially jeopardizing those species or areas.
245
Congress could have created a similar structure for designating
marine sanctuaries, allowing citizens to force consideration of sites
by demonstrating that they meet certain criteria, requiring
completion of the steps of the consideration process within specific
timetables, and allowing citizens to sue, based again on specific
decisional criteria, to challenge either sanctuary designations or
failures to designate. The result might have been a litigious,
contentious designation process, but that process would likely have
moved forward without requiring Congress's active
intervention.246
There are, at least in theory, some potential benefits to the
alternative Congress selected. Many critics chafe at the top-down,
litigious, command-and-control style of federal environmental law
enforcement;247  by delegating power to an underfunded,
understaffed agency not accustomed to resource policy-making,
Congress may have limited the possibility of overbearing behavior.
Additionally, an energetic, ambitious, idealistic, and conservation-
oriented staff faced with a dearth of resources might develop
suits to enforce the Act's provisions); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000)
(also authorizing citizen suits); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(2000) (also authorizing citizen suits).
242 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(g), 1536 (prohibiting federal agencies from taking
actions likely to jeopardize the survival of endangered species, and requiring
specific consultation procedures designed to ensure that such actions are
avoided).
243 Id. § 1540(g); § 1533 (creating detailed, enforceable duties for the
Secretary of the Interior to fulfill when considering species for listing).
244 Id. §§ 1540(g), 1533(b)(2).
245 See id. § 1540(g)(1)(b), (c).
246 Cf supra notes 104-107.
241 E.g., Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A
Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & CoM. 585, 587 (1996); see Richard J. Lazarus,
Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 727-28 (2000) (discussing Justice Scalia's
antipathy toward federal environmental law).
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creative new ways of achieving environmental protection.248 Out
of all the community outreach and grassroots development work
done by the program staff, an alternative to the traditionally
litigious model of federal environmental policy-making might
develop. 249  The 1998 Center for the Economy and the
Environment Report hints at just such an outcome, suggesting that
the Sanctuary Program was beginning to develop a new and more
modem bureaucratic model.25°
That new model isn't worth much, however, if it cannot
provide effective protection, and so far all reports indicate that
current system, while perhaps enabling some sanctuaries to
achieve laudatory and surprising successes, is not sufficient to
achieve the goals set by Congress in 1972. The program has
provided only uneven protection of its existing system, and
certainly has not been able, without outside assistance, to power
any sanctuary nominations through the designation process.
Creative outreach and an idealistic staff may be invaluable assets
but, absent strong legal or financial incentives, they will rarely
provide sufficient leverage to protect national resources. Congress
could have provided such financial or legal incentives, but instead
left the program without any sort of internal or external engine. As
a result, the slow pace of designations ought to be anything but
surprising.
C. Political Expedience of Frustration
The underlying problems with the Act could have made the
program a complete failure. Instead, Congress adapted, applying
irregular but at times intense external pressure and ensuring that at
least some designations would take place. The result was some
frustration, but also the creation of an alternative system that
proved politically expedient, allowing Congress to accept credit
for the program's successes and duck responsibility for its failures.
Accordingly, despite past outbursts of congressional outrage, the
Marine Sanctuaries Program could prove difficult to change.
248 Cf supra notes 163, 177, and accompanying text.
249 Of course, even outreach, although potentially cheaper than enforcement,
requires money.
251 CTR. FOR THE ECON. AND THE ENv'T, supra note 58, at 29 ("The federal
land management agencies offer one possible model for how the sanctuary
program could organize itself to get work done. But the sanctuary program is
slowly developing a different and indeed more modem model.").
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By delegating authority to an underfunded, outgunned agency
and giving both stakeholders and legislators numerous access
points to influence the designation process, Congress ensured that
designations were unlikely to occur in the absence of
congressional support. Few members of Congress would expect to
face unwanted designations in their districts. On the other hand, if
Congress did wish to have protection, NOAA was unlikely to be
able to provide it, and thus individual members had the
opportunity to play the hero in bringing protection to their areas.
And if those designations failed to occur, NOAA or the
administration, rather than Congress, was likely to be the villain.
The system was not politically perfect; a strongly opposed
administration could thwart Congress's desire to gain even highly
desired sanctuaries, and the Reagan and Bush administrations may,
from Congress' perspective, have played the villain's role with
sometimes frustrating enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the Marine
Sanctuaries Program quickly came to offer Congress extraordinary
political gains at almost no cost. The consistent congressional
support for the program therefore is not surprising; as a political
tool, at least, the program has been rather convenient.
IV
THE FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM
Thirty years after its original passage, the NMSA now stands
at an uncertain junction. On one hand, the Hawaiian Islands
designation has the potential to usher in an entirely new era of
marine protection.25' At the same time, a conservative
administration and Congress are showing little inclination to
broadly extend federal protection of natural resources. The
political moment may not be right to even sustain Clinton's
eleventh hour initiatives, let alone transform the marine sanctuaries
system into an effective comprehensive ocean management
scheme with a clearly defined mission. Nevertheless, the. Act will
be due for reauthorization in 2005, and stories about the need for
expanded and heightened protection of oceans are almost
commonplace in the news and the academic literature.252 Congress
251 See supra notes 190-195 and accompanying text.
252 See, e.g., Brax, supra note 8, at 127-29; Carr & Scheiber, supra note 2, at
45-46; Craig, supra note 1, at 10,192-93.
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will have, if it chooses, the opportunity to seize this moment and
give the program the direction it needs to truly succeed.
Congress may choose to continue the system as it currently
exists. Designations will remain sporadic and geographically,
piecemeal, dependent upon the whims of Congress and the
executive, or will require extraordinary and basically
unprecedented determination from NOAA. Protection within the
sanctuary system will be at times creative and innovative but will
generally remain uneven, with critics charging that the greatest
threats to sanctuary protection often remain unaddressed. Those
sanctuaries that are designated, however, will be, for at least some
politicians, politically valuable triumphs.
Alternatively, Congress could overhaul the National Marine
Sanctuaries Act. Instead of continuing to grant a degree of
discretion unprecedented on land, it could create a more rational
system of sanctuary designation. Such a system ought to have
several elements. First, Congress or the President, rather than
NOAA, ought to be the primary agent of designations. NOAA
ought to play a facilitative role; its scientific expertise would be
quite helpful. Asking it to direct the designation process, however,
only insulates Congress and the President from accepting
responsibility for making intensely controversial political
decisions. Second, Congress ought to clarify the mission of the
sanctuaries. If sanctuaries are to function, as they have in the past,
primarily as withdrawals from oil and gas leasing, Congress need
not perpetuate the charade of requiring much broader studies of
protection or the illusion that once a sanctuary is designated
comprehensive protection exists. On the other hand, if sanctuaries
truly are to provide such comprehensive protection, Congress
ought to provide some baseline sustainability-based criteria to
guide their management.
253
If Congress does leave responsibility in the hands of NOAA,
it could, through more specific evaluation criteria and specific
procedural deadlines, facilitate a more effective designation
process. It also could explicitly tie NOAA's funding to successful
designations. These reforms, in combination, would provide
NOAA with more specific direction for its designation efforts and
253 This suggestion is not new, and the mission statement suggested by the
Marine Sanctuaries Review Team ought to provide a good starting point. See
supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
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with incentives to move it through the designation process. The
result would probably be far less effective than direct
congressional intervention, but it would at least provide NOAA
with more leverage than it currently enjoys. These changes would
create a more controversial program, of course. The travails of the
land management agencies illustrate that an increased scope of
responsibility inevitably increases an agency's headaches.
Protection, however, will not be possible without such
controversy, and protection of America's oceans is badly needed.
CONCLUSION
Thirty years ago, Congress created a program ostensibly
intended to insure comprehensive, balanced management of
America's ocean resources. The program has met with some
success, but flaws inherent in the original National Marine
Sanctuaries Act have prevented the program from functioning as
planned. Instead of creating a process by which NOAA could
utilize a science-based designation and management process,
Congress, by failing to delegate authority to a sufficiently powerful
agency and by depriving that agency of the funding necessary to
achieve its goals, almost assured a history of inaction. As a result,
NOAA's weakness, in combination with active opposition from oil
and gas-friendly administrations, necessitated congressional
intervention in order to make any significant progress in moving
the Marine Sanctuary Program closer to its stated goals.
Congress could, and should, reform the program. By
allocating more money to NOAA, and by either supplying NOAA
with stronger incentives or by accepting on its own shoulders
responsibility for sustaining the program, Congress could create a
more effective system of designation and management,
strengthening existing protections and extending protection to vast
areas currently uncovered by the program. To do so will require
Congress to deprive itself of a risk-free opportunity to curry favor
with voters, transforming a politically innocuous program into one
capable of generating intense controversy. In the absence of the
political resolve necessary to make such a step, however, the
program will continue to provide uneven and inadequate
protection, achieving some modest successes but falling well short
of its potential.
20031
